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Note
The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 (c): A Suggested Approach
I INTRODUCTION
Section 1985(c)l was originally enacted in 1871 as part of
the Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation.2 Popularly
known as the Ku Klux Klan Act,3 section two of the statute
granted a civil remedy to any person or class of persons injured
by a conspiracy to deprive them of equal protection of the laws
or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws.4 As its
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976). The statute provides in relevant part:
If two or more persons ... conspire or go in disguise on the high-
way or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws ... in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or
more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in fur-
therance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured
in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occa-
sioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
Prior to 1976, section 1985(c) was codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Althodgh this
Note will refer to the section as section 1985(c), many of the cases and secon-
dary sources cited thrbughout this Note refer to the section as section 1985(3).
2. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13. Five major pieces of legisla-
tion were enacted after the Civil War to guarantee enforcement of the rights
secured by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments: Act of Apr. 9,
1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (outlawing Southern Black Codes); Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 14, 16 Stat. 140 (protecting voting rights); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat.
433 (protecting voting rights); Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (the Ku
Klux Klan Act); Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (prohibiting racial dis-
crimination in public accommodations).
3. The Act was originally entitled, "An Act to enforce the Provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for
other Purposes." Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
4 Section two provided in relevant part-
That if two or more persons within any State or Territory of the United
States . . . shall conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public
highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose, either di-
rectly or indirectly, of depriving any person or any class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities
under the laws ... each and every person so offending shall be
deemed guilty of a high crime, and, upon conviction thereof... shall
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popular name suggests, the Act was designed to provide a rem-
edy for Klan violence that many states refused or were unable
to provide in the lawless conditions that existed in southern
states during the post-Civil War period.5
The statute lay dormant for many years,6 due primarily to
the strict constructionism of a notably hostile Supreme Court.7
The Court's tendency to narrowly construe the civil rights stat-
utes became evident soon after their enactment. In United
States v. Harris,8 the Supreme Court declared the criminal an-
alogue to section 1985(c) 9 unconstitutional on the ground that
be punished by a fine not less than five hundred nor more than five
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor...
or by both such fine and imprisonment as the court shall determine.
And if any one or more persons engaged in any such conspiracy shall
do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby any person shall be injured ... or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the person so injured or deprived of such rights and privileges
may have and maintain an action for the recovery of damages ...
against any one or more of the persons engaged in such conspir-
acy ....
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13.
5. The Ku Klux Klan Act provided both civil and criminal penalties for
deprivation of federal rights and gave the President the power to suppress vio-
lence when states failed to do so in certain situations. President Grant's
message to Congress illustrates one of the main concerns behind the Act:
To the Senate and House of Representatives:
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union ren-
dering life and property insecure .... That the power to correct these
evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt ....
Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of
Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the en-
forcement of law in all parts of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1871). See generally THE RECONSTRUC-
TION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 484-570 (A. Avins ed. 1967).
6. No reported cases arose under section 1985(c) from the date of enact-
ment until 1920. See Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Ade-
quate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951).
7. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MIcH. L. REV. 1323, 1336-37 (1952); Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Dis-
crimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era
Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451-54 (1974).
8. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
9. The criminal analogue to section 1985(c) provided:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in dis-
guise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws ... each of such persons shall be pun-
ished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than five thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, not less
than six months nor more than six years, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment.
REV. STAT. § 5519 (1875) (enacted during 1873-1874 congressional session). Sec-
tion 5519 was originally part of section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17
Stat. 13 (1871).
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the statute was beyond Congress' power to enact.'0 In Collins
v. Hardyman," the first Supreme Court case to directly con-
sider section 1985(c), the Court imposed a state action require-
ment, reasoning that the statute could not reach conspiracies to
deprive others of equal protection of the laws unless "some ma-
nipulation of the law or its agencies" was involved.12
The Court's restrictive approach gradually eased, as evi-
denced by cases such as United States v. Price13 and United
States v. Guest,'4 which revitalized section 241,15 the closest re-
maining criminal counterpart to section 1985(c). Yet it was not
10. United States v. Harris involved an alleged conspiracy by twenty white
men to deprive four arrested black men of equal protection by beating, wound-
ing, and mistreating them. 106 U.S. at 629-31. The Court was operating under a
strict severability rule, first applied in United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221
(1876), which required the Court to find an entire statute unconstitutional if
any construction of the statute exceeded Congress' power. In Harris, the Court
reasoned that since the statute was directed at private conduct, it could not
stem from the fourteenth amendment, and that since it could be extended to a
conspiracy of two or more free white persons, it could not be authorized by the
thirteenth amendment; therefore, it was held unconstitutional. 106 U.S. at 640-
41. This method of constitutional analysis was later rejected by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 24 (1960).
11. 341 U.S. 651 (1951). Collins involved an alleged conspiracy by private
individuals to disrupt a political meeting called to adopt a resolution opposing
the Marshall Plan. Id. at 653-54.
12. Id. at 661. The imposition of a state action requirement was clearly
designed to avoid the "constitutional problems of the first magnitude" (i.e., lack
of authority under the fourteenth amendment), id. at 659, that were recognized
in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882). See notes 8-10 supra and accom-
panying text. Although the Court did not directly confront the Harris prece-
dent, which had struck down a virtually identical statute as unconstitutional, it
must have recognized the need to either overrule Harris or distinguish the stat-
ute. The Court chose the latter alternative and distinguished section 1985(c) by
imposing the state action requirement. See generally Gressman, supra note 7,
at 1355-57.
13. 383 U.S. 787 (1966). Price involved an alleged conspiracy between law
enforcement officials and fifteen private individuals to assault and kill three
blacks who had been released from prison on an unpaved road in the middle of
the night. The Court broadened the definition of state action to include all will-
ful participants in joint activity with the state or its agents. Id. at 794.
14. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Plaintiffs in United States v. Guest alleged a con-
spiracy by six private individuals to deprive blacks of the right to use state fa-
cilities, the right to engage in interstate travel, and the right to equal enjoyment
of places of public accommodation. The majority of the Court found that pri-
vate individuals who cause the arrest of blacks through false reports of crimi-
nal activity cooperate with the state for purposes of section 241. Id. at 756. It is
also significant that six Justices, in two separate concurring opinions, found
that section five of the fourteenth amendment enabled Congress to reach pri-
vate conspiracies under section 241. See id. at 762 (Harlan, J., concurring); id.
at 777 (Brennan, J., concurring).
15. At the time these cases were decided, section 241 provided:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or in-
timidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
1980]
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until 1971, one hundred years after enactment, that the Court in
Griffin v. Breckenridge16 would "accord to the words of the
statute their apparent meaning"' 7 by interpreting section
1985(c) to reach conspiracies by private persons.18 Noting the
"constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting
[section 1985(c) ] as a general federal tort law,"' 9 however, the
Court imposed an important limitation by requiring that "there
must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidi-
ously discriminatory animus behind the conspirator's action."20
Because the Court confined its decision to the particular
facts involved in Griffin,21 the opinion left many unanswered
questions, and as a result has created a significant amount of
confusion.22 This confusion is apparent in subsequent lower
court decisions that have attempted to determine the extent of
the protection afforded by section 1985(c). Apart from the
class-based animus requirement, lower courts have narrowly
defined the scope of the statute by restrictively construing the
conspiracy requirements, 23 requiring an illegal act independent
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 241, 62 Stat. 696 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1976)).
16. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). The alleged conspiracy in Griffin was an attempt by
white citizens to deprive black citizens of their right of interstate travel. Mis-
taking one of the blacks for a civil rights worker, a group of whites forced them
out of their car, and assaulted and beat them. Id. at 89-91.
17. Id. at 96.
18. "It is thus evident that all indicators-text, companion provisions, and
legislative history-point unwaveringly to § 19851 (c) ]'s coverage of private con-
spiracies." Id. at 101.
19. Id. at 102.
20. Id. In addition to the class-based animus requirement, the Court set
forth the four basic elements necessary to state a cause of action under the
statute: (1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving any person or class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, (3) an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, and (4) resulting injury or the deprivation of any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States. Id. at 102-03.
21. The Court stated that "since the allegations of the complaint bring this
cause of action so close to the constitutionally authorized core of the statute,
there has been no occasion here to trace out its constitutionally permissible pe-
riphery." Id. at 107.
22. See Selzer v. Berkowitz, 459 F. Supp. 347, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
23. Since Griffin, a successful claim under section 1985(c) must allege both
a conspiracy and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See note 20
supra. Some lower courts have also applied an additional limitation, which
precludes recovery when all defendants are employed by a single corporate en-
[Vol. 64.635
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of the section 1985(c) violation,24 and limiting the scope of fed-
eral rights protected against private conspiracies.
25
One obvious way in which the ultimate reach of section
1985(c) is affected is through a determination of which federal
rights are protected.26 In Griffn, the Court held that thirteenth
tity such as a university or business concern. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Dowling,
459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972) (real estate corporation's agents held incapable
of forming conspiracy); Johnson v. University of Pittsburgh, 435 F. Supp. 1328,
1370 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (university cannot conspire with itself); Girard v. 94th St.
& Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976) (corporate board of directors acting in of-
ficial capacity cannot conspire with itself). This limitation has been called the
"single legal actor rule." Note, Intracorporate Conspiracies Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(c), 92 HARv. L. REv. 470 (1978).
In agency law, the "single legal actor rule" represents the societal judg-
ment that an enterprise should bear the costs of accidents and injuries caused
by employees conducting its business. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 459 (4th ed. 1971). A finding of conspiracy based
on this rule, and thus no liability in section 1985(c) cases, runs counter to the
agency rationale, and several cases have rejected the strict application of the
rule in a civil rights context. See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1256-59 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979); Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167,
1176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See generally Note, supra.
24. In McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 925 (5th Cir.
1977), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first interpreted the statute to
require an independently illegal act apart from the section 1985(c) violation.
The court based its interpretation of the statute on the reference in Griffin to
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), which noted that "[t]he only way
* .. one private person can deprive another of the equal protection of the laws
is by the commission of some offence against the laws which protect the rights
of persons, as by theft, burglary, arson, libel, assault, or murder." Id. at 643,
quoted in McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 925 (5th Cir.
1977). Commentators have noted that the illegal act requirement bears little re-
lationship to section 1985(c)'s language or case law, and is too nebulous and
difficult to apply. See generally Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil
Rights: McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 90 HAv. L. REV. 1721
(1977); Comment, Independently Illegal Act by Defendant is Necessary Element
of Cause of Action Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 9 Rtrr.-CA av. L.J. 187 (1977).
Nevertheless, this requirement has been adopted as a threshold test for section
1985(c) claims within the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Britt v. Suckle, 453 F. Supp.
987, 992 (E.D. Tex. 1978); Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838, 844-45 (M.D. Fla.
1978). It has not yet been applied elsewhere.
25. This issue first appeared in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), in
which the Supreme Court denied recovery when a political meeting was dis-
rupted by private individuals. The Court reasoned that the fourteenth amend-
ment did not shield against "merely private conduct." Id. at 658 (quoting
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). Prior to Griffin, the decision was in-
terpreted as imposing a state action requirement on all section 1985(c) suits.
See Gressman, supra note 7, at 1356.
26. See generally Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HAv. L. REV. 91 (1966); Comment, Private Conspiracies to
Violate Civil Rights: McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 90 HARv. L.
REV. 1721 (1977); Note, Civil Rights-State Action is a Requirement for the Ap-
1980]
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amendment rights 27 and the right to interstate travel28 were
protected by the statute against private interference, but spe-
cifically declined to state whether Congress had the power
under section five of the fourteenth amendment to reach pri-
vate conspiracies to deprive persons of their fourteenth amend-
ment rights.29 Subsequent lower court decisions have been
divided on this issue,30 and the most recent Supreme Court
case, Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Novotny,3 1 failed to resolve it.32 The question of which federal
rights are protected by section 1985(c) is a critical one, because
plication of Section 1985(3) to First Amendment Rights, 54 N.C. L. REv. 677
(1976).
27. 403 U.S. at 105.
28. Id. at 105-06.
29. Id. at 107 ("In identifying these two constitutional sources of congres-
sional power, we do not imply the absence of any other. More specifically, the
allegations of the complaint in this case have not required consideration of the
scope of the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
The Court's refusal to decide this issue, coupled with its failure to directly
overrule Collins, left open the question of whether the requirement of state ac-
tion still exists when a fourteenth amendment right is involved.
30. The Courts of Appeals for both the Fourth and the Seventh Circuits
have held that Congress does not have the power to reach private conspiracies
that violate the fourteenth amendment. The primary rationales for this ap-
proach have been: (1) to limit the scope of federal power in a traditionally
state area; and (2) to avoid adopting a different approach without a Supreme
Court pronouncement on the issue. Under this view, section 1985(c) can reach
conspiracies to violate rights protected by the fourteenth amendment only if
state action is involved. Private conspiracies to violate rights that stem from
other provisions of the Constitution, such as the right to vote, the right to
travel, and the right to be free of the badges and incidents of slavery, may still
be reached by section 1985(c). See Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d
504, 506-07 (4th Cir. 1974); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir.
1972).
The Eighth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that, through sec-
tion five of the fourteenth amendment, Congress does have the power to reach
private conspiracies to violate fourteenth amendment rights. See Westberry v.
Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, vacated en banc per curiam as moot, 507 F.2d
216 (1975); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971). Westberry has been
followed by lower courts in the Fifth Circuit. See, e.g., Puentes v. Sullivan, 425
F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Tex. 1977). The theory that Congress can reach private con-
spiracies through section five is based primarily on United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966), in which six Justices (though not the plurality opinion) ex-
pressed the view that the section could be so construed. See id. at 763 (Clark,
J., concurring); id. at 782 (Brennan, J., concurring).
31. 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979). Novotny involved a white male who was allegedly
fired by a private employer because he advocated equal employment opportu-
nities for women. Id. at 2347.
32. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Novotny that the
commerce clause empowers Congress to provide sanctions against private con-
spiracies to interfere with title VII rights, but declined to confront the section 5
issue: "Inasmuch as we need not rest on the Fourteenth Amendment to justify
the application of § 1985[ (c)] to this case, it is not necessary at this time to re-
[Vol. 64:635
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of the interrelationship between the rights protected under the
statute and the definition of protected classes.33 Despite this
connection, separate consideration of the class-based animus
requirement is warranted, since the Griffin decision requires
proof of such animus in all section 1985(c) cases. 34
This Note will examine the requirement of invidiously dis-
criminatory class-based animus as it has been applied since
Griffin v. Breckenridge. While the class-based animus require-
ment is superior to other limitations designed to prevent the
creation of a general federal tort remedy because it gives full
effect to the original congressional purpose, it has also been the
most elusive and inconsistently applied of the section 1985(c)
elements. Three general questions will be addressed: (1) what
classes are protected by the statute, (2) what relationship the
plaintiff must have to a protected class, and (3) what facts must
be alleged and proven to establish that the defendants were
motivated by an invidiously discriminatory animus toward the
particular class. In conclusion, the Note will suggest how the
class-based animus requirement could best be utilized to pro-
solve the scope of its Fourteenth Amendment foundation." Novotny v. Great
Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1255 (3d Cir. 1978).
Similarly, the Supreme Court majority decided only the limited issue of
whether a person injured by a conspiracy to violate section 704(a) of title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is deprived of the "equal protection of the laws"
within the meaning of section 1985(c). See 99 S. Ct. at 2349. The concurring
opinions did address the issue of which rights section 1985(c) protects in some-
what broader terms. Justice Powell suggested that section 1985(c) was limited
to only those fundamental rights derived from the Constitution and not subse-
quently created statutory rights. See id. at 2352-53. Justice Stevens directly
confronted the section five issue, asserting that there can be "no claim for relief
based on a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment if there has been no in-
volvement by the state." Id. at 2355.
The dissent, authored by Justice White and joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, concluded that the Court had an obligation to honor the terms of
section 1985(c) apart from title VII, and that Congress had sufficient power
under the commerce clause to prohibit and provide a remedy for invidious pri-
vate conspiracies to deny title VII rights. Id. at 2361 & n.20.
33. See notes 124-126 infra and accompanying text; Note, The Scope of Sec-
tion 1985(3) Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 256-57
(1977).
34. See, e.g., Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 468-69 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (requirement of class-based animus applies to both
public and private conspiracies); Lesser v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 518 F.2d 538,
543 (7th Cir. 1975) (nothing in Griffin intimates that the requirement of class-
based animus is limited to private conspiracies). Cf. Nouse v. Nouse, 450 F.
Supp. 97, 100 (D. Md. 1978) (quoting Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326,
1333 n.11 (4th Cir. 1976)) (the issues of class-based animus and the nature of
the right denied are separate and distinct). But see Selzer v. Berkowitz, 459 F.
Supp. 347, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (no class-based animus is required if state action
is alleged).
1980l
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vide an effective, constitutional remedy for discriminatory ac-
tions that violate federal rights.
IL INVIDIOUSLY DISCRIMINATORY CLASS-BASED
ANIMUS
The Griffin Court held only that discrimination motivated
by racial bias was actionable under section 1985(c), reserving
the question of whether other discrimination was covered by
the statute.35 Lower courts have not hesitated to expand sec-
tion 1985(c) to reach other class-based motives; but while virtu-
ally all lower courts have agreed that failure to allege any class-
based animus is a fatal defect,36 there is no uniformity regard-
ing what is required beyond mere allegation of such animus.
A. DETERMINATION OF PROTECTED CLASSES
The determination of which classes are protected is a key
variable in defining the reach of section 1985(c). Despite the
narrow holding in Griffin, every appellate court that has consid-
ered the issue has concluded that the section is not limited to
classes defined by race.3 7 This conclusion was tacitly approved
by the Supreme Court in Novotny when the majority of the
Court assumed that classes based on sex were also actionable,
without directly addressing the class-based animus require-
ment.3
8
Since Griffin, most lower courts have extended protection
to clearly defined classes such as those based on religion 39 or
sex.40 In cases involving less easily defined classes, however,
35. See 403 U.S. at 102 n.9 ("We need not decide, given the facts of this
case, whether a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent
other than racial bias would be actionable. .. ").
36. See, e.g., Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838, 846 (M.D. Fla. 1978), and
cases cited therein; note 34 supra and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm., 435 F.
Supp. 1063, 1065 (S.D. Me.'1977), and cases cited therein.
38. Although Griffin v. Breckenridge ... did not reach the issue
whether discrimination on a basis other than race may be vindicated
under § 1985(c), the Court correctly assumes that the answer to this
question is yes. The statute broadly refers to all privileges and immu-
nities, without any limitation as to the class of persons to whom these
rights may be granted. It is clear that sex discrimination may be suffi-
ciently invidious to come within the prohibition of § 1985(c) ....
Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345, 2358 n.6 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
39. See, e.g., Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973) (Jews);
Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (members of the Unification
Church).
40. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of N. America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir.
[Vol. 64:635
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lower courts have reached inconsistent results. For example,
classes that have recently been held to be protected by section
1985(c) include the following: professors who talk to or associ-
ate with the CIA;41 local unions;42 demonstrators;43 supporters
of a political candidate 44 nonunion workers and their employ-
ers;45 persons voting for a sham candidate;46 worshipers at a
predominantly white Catholic church disrupted by human
rights demonstrators;47 and persons attempting to furnish ad-
vice, information, and services to migrant workers in agricul-
tural labor camps. 48
Far more classes have been denied the protection of sec-
tion 1985(c): employees who file complaints against their em-
ployer;49 bankrupts;50 land developers;5 1 tenant organizers;52
doctors who testify in malpractice suits; 53 homeowners raided
by federal drug enforcement agents; 54 nonlawyers;55 and white
1979); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1978); Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F.
Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1978); Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm., 435
F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. Me. 1977); Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167
(E.D. Pa. 1976).
41. See Selzer v. Berkowitz, 459 F. Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
42. See Local 1 (ACA), Broadcast Employees v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
43. See, e.g., Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc'y of Friends
v. Tate, 519 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1975); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975); Brown v. Villanova Univ., 378 F.
Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
44. See, e.g., Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973); Puentes v. Sul-
livan, 425 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Tex. 1977).
45. See Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
46. See Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
910 (1974).
47. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
48. See Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
49. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 460 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
Cf. Peacock v. Guaranty Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 77-0116-Civ-T-GC (M.D.
Fla., filed Dec. 11, 1979) (employees discharged for refusal to take polygraph
exam).
50. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1977).
51. See Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1978).
52. See Carchman v. Korman Corp., 594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 205 (1979).
53. See Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
930 (1973).
54. See Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976).
55. See Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1978). Other occupational
classes denied protection under section 1985(c) include: fireworks manufactur-
ers, Cartolano v. Tyrrell, 421 F. Supp. 526 (N.D. IMl. 1976); lawyers, Kops v. New
York Tel. Co., 456 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affid mem., 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir.
1979); and local farm workers displaced by illegal aliens, Lopez v. Arrowhead
Ranches, 523 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1975).
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farm families.56
As the above cases illustrate, there is often no immediately
discernible difference between classes that have been found to
be covered by the statute and those that have not.57 These di-
chotomous results may stem from the fact that in many cases
the question of class receives only cursory treatment or is sim-
ply ignored.58 Even courts that have offered a rationale for
their decisions have found it difficult to develop a definition of
class that can be uniformly applied to section 1985(c) cases. A
more systematic approach is clearly warranted.
1. Legislative History of Section 1985(c)
The language of both section 1985(c) and its predecessor
statute is very broad,59 and provides no indication that Con-
gress intended to reach only particular classes. 60 Congres-
sional debates and the original statute's popular title both
suggest that protection of groups terrorized by the Ku Klux
Klan-white Union sympathizers and blacks-was of prime
concern. During the debate on the original statute, Senator
56. See Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979).
57. Compare Local 1 (ACA), Broadcast Employees v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263, 277 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (animus against a union suffi-
cient to state a claim under section 1985(c)) with Western Telecasters, Inc. v.
California Fed'n of Labor, 415 F. Supp. 30, 33 (S.D. Cal. 1976) (animus against a
union does not constitute invidiously discriminatory class-based animus).
Compare Seizer v. Berkowitz, 459 F. Supp. 347, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (plaintiff's
inability to specifically identify other class members or to prove similar con-
spiracies directed at such class members does not prevent finding of a pro-
tected class) with McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 75 (8th Cir.
1976) (failure to allege that defendant's conduct was directed at a significant
number of persons on the basis of their shared characteristics removes plain-
tiff's claim from the reach of section 1985(c)).
58. For example, compare the treatment of the class issue in Selzer v.
Berkowitz, 459 F. Supp. 347, 349-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) with the treatment in Brown
v. Villanova Univ., 378 F. Supp. 342, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also note 157 in-
fra.
59. The language of section two of the Ku Klux Klan Act was substantially
the same as the language of section 1985(c). Compare note 1 supra with note 4
supra.
60. Representative Shellabarger's remarks indicate that the purpose of the
statute was to provide a remedy for the violation of the equality rights of any
American citizen: "any violation of the right, the animus and effect of which is
to strike down the citizen, to the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as
contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be within the scope of the
remedies of this section." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1871), quoted
in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) (emphasis in original). See
notes 141-155 infra and accompanying text. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
201-02 (1961) (legislative history of section 1985(c) indicates that Congress did
not intend the statute to reach only activities of the Ku Klux Klan, but any con-
spiracy of two or more persons).
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Pratt noted that laws failed "when a man of known Union senti-
ments, white or black, invokes their aid. '6 1 Representative
Perry described the Klansmen's operations as "directed chiefly
against blacks and against white people who by any means at-
tract attention as earnest friends of the blacks. '62
Although the protection of Ku Klux Klan victims was the
most immediate concern, both proponents and opponents of
the Act understood that the statute would cover other groups
as well. Senator Hoar described the purpose of section 1985(c)
as ensuring "that under no temptation of party spirit, under no
political excitement, under no jealousy of race or caste, will the
majority either in numbers or strength in any State seek to de-
prive the remainder of the population of their civil rights. '63
Senator Edmunds' comments, later cited in the Griffin opin-
ion,64 further illustrate the approach to the class issue that
Congress originally envisione&
We do not undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be called
a private conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or
set of men against another to prevent one [from] getting an indictment
in the State courts against men for burning down his barn; but, if in a
case like this, it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against
this man because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was
a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a
Vermonter ... then this section could reach it.6 5
The Act also inspired extensive congressional debate over
the effect that the statute might have on the federal-state bal-
ance.66 The Griffin Court was concerned about this balance as
61. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (1871), quoted in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 178 (1961).
62. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 78 app. (1871). See CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. 320 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Stoughton) ("There exists at
this time in the southern States a treasonable conspiracy against the lives, per-
sons, and property of Union citizens."). See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 174-75 (1961).
63. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 335 (1871), quoted in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167, 182-83 (1961).
64. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 n.9 (1971).
65. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871).
66. Consider, for example, the statements made by Senators Thurman and
Morton during congressional debates:
The constitutional question involved is as to the power of Congress to
go into a State and punish offenses, not against the laws of the United
States ... but merely to punish ... ordinary crimes, such as are pun-
ishable by the State law. Whenever that question shall come ... I will
show you by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
as well as by the plain text of the Constitution, that you have no such
power at all.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Thurman).
But it is said these crimes should be punished by the States; that
they are already offenses against the laws of the States, and the matter
should be left with the States. The answer to that is, that the States do
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well, and clearly did not intend that by removing the state ac-
tion requirement, section 1985(c) would be extended to every
conceivable class.67 Lower courts have subsequently sought to
balance the need to provide a federal remedy for discrimina-
tory violations of federal rights with the need to prevent section
1985(c) from becoming a federal tort law. In fact, most lower
courts have assiduously, if not overzealously, guarded against a
broad interpretation of the statute.68 Although few decisions
have specifically drawn from the legislative history for guid-
ance, a variety of criteria have been proposed to define the
classes covered by the statute.
2. Clearly Defined Groups
Perhaps the broadest proposed criterion to limit the type of
classes covered by the statute has been the requirement that
the class be clearly defined.69 Under this approach, if a plaintiff
can show that he was denied the protection of the law because
of his membership in any clearly defined group, he has estab-
lished an actionable claim.70 Although it is desirable to require
clearly defined classes, to prevent the statute from becoming a
general federal tort law, a more restrictive approach is neces-
sary. As one court aptly stated:
When the court in Griffln suggested that [class-based animus] might
suffice to activate the Ku Klux Klan Act, it did not intend to sweep into
that Act any conspiracy that was aimed at two or more people with a
single common trait. If the statute were that panoramic, then a con-
spiracy directed at pedestrians who walk on a certain street, at motor-
ists who drive on a particular road, or at people who wear blue shirts
... would be equally embraced.
7 1
not punish them; the States do not protect the rights of the people; the
State courts are powerless to redress these wrongs.
Id. at 252 app. (remarks of Sen. Morton).
67. That the statute was meant to reach private action does not, how-
ever, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial
interferences with the rights of others.... The constitutional shoals
that would lie in the path of interpreting [§ 1985(c)] as a general fed-
eral tort law can be avoided by ... requiring, as an element of the
cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation
stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment.
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1971).
68. See notes 49-56 supra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973)
("§ 1985[ (c) ]'s protection reaches clearly defined classes, such as supporters of
a political candidate"); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1233 (1st Cir. 1972) (no
cause of action when class is neither "readily recognizable" nor one tradition-
ally protected by the Civil Rights Act); Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 229
(E.D. Tex. 1978) (discriminatory crimes must be directed towards a "discern-
able and definite class").
70. See Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973).
71. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 269, 274-75 (E.D. La. 1978).
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Accordingly, the requirement that the class be easily defined is
merely a starting point in determining the scope of protection
afforded by the statute.
3. Groups That Possess an Intellectual Nexus Between
Individual Members
A more detailed approach to defining the scope of section
1985(c) was adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co.72 In Westberry, the plaintiff al-
leged that defendants fired and planned to murder him because
of his environmental views and related activities.7 3 The court's
proposed definition of class was obviously structured with this
specific allegation in mind:
There need not necessarily be an organizational structure of adherents,
but there must exist an identifiable body with which the particular
plaintiff associated himself by some affirmative act.... [A]t least [the
class] must have an intellectual nexus which has somehow been com-
municated to, among and by the members of the group.7 4
Section 1985(c) was thus extended to cover an employee de-
prived of his rights because he expressed a minority philosoph-
ical viewpoint and was associated with a group of
environmentalists. Although the application of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's definition to the facts in Westberry has some appeal, ap-
plying such an amorphous definition to restrict the scope of
section 1985(c) in future cases would have limited practical
utility. Uniformity would be difficult to achieve unless a more
precise definition of what constitutes an "identifiable body" and
an "intellectual nexus" can be developed.
4. Well-Established, Easily Recognized Groups
The Westberry case demonstrates the difficulties inherent
in a definition of class based on political or ideological belief.
In an effort to avoid vagueness, some courts have allowed re-
covery only where a traditionally recognized or well-estab-
lished group exists. For example, the court in Silkwood v. Kerr-
72. 507 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.), vacated en banc per curiam as moot, 507 F.2d
215 (5th Cir. 1975). Westberry was vacated as moot and thus set no legal prece-
dent. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950); Board of Educ.
v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, 401 F. Supp. 687, 692 n.3
(N.D. Ga. 1975). Nevertheless, a subsequent case has quoted the Westberry
court's definition of proposed class, stating that "the reasoning... was and is
valid in the light of Griffin." Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 840 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976). Contra, Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 401 F.
Supp. 420, 423 (Wi). Pa. 1975).
73. 507 F.2d at 209.
74. Id. at 215.
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
McGee Corp.75 refused to recognize a class of union organizers
to which the plaintiff belonged, but acknowledged that classes
such as Jehovah's Witnesses, persons of Japanese origin, or
Democrats might be protected by section 1985(c). 76 The dis-
tinction that the court attempted to draw between union or-
ganizers and Democrats appears to revolve around the idea
that a class of union organizers is defined by the plaintiff's ac-
tivities vis-a-vis the defendants, rather than by the plaintiff's
ideology or belief alone.7 7 This is a fine distinction, however,
and one that is difficult to apply on a case-by-case basis.7 8
Other courts have required that the class be an identifiable
group of a certain size. In Rodgers v. Tolson,7 9 the plaintiffs al-
leged that they belonged to a class composed of those who are
outspoken in their political and philosophical opposition to
town commissioners. The court denied recovery because the
plaintiffs did not "define a larger group that could be objec-
tively identified by an observer. It is impossible to determine
who besides the [plaintiffs] belong [sic] to this class; indeed,
the [plaintiffs] cannot identify any other members. '80 Recov-
ery has also been denied where the plaintiff admitted that "he
might be the only class member in New Hampshire,"8' and
75. 460 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Okla. 1978). In Silkwood, the plaintiff alleged
that the owner of the nuclear power facility at which she was employed con-
spired with the FBI to deprive her and other workers of their equal rights
through force, violence, and intimidation because of their union organizing ac-
tivities, and because they filed complaints against their employer with the
Atomic Energy Commission. The court denied recovery on the ground that
there was neither a class-based animus nor a protected federal right involved.
Id. at 407, 411.
76. Id. at 407.
77. Cf. Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 984 (1974) (no section 1985(c) claim when plaintiff newspaper dealers were
injured financially by defendant newspaper company, since plaintiffs "Were not
injured because they were newspaper dealers ... but because of their activi-
ties in attempting to maintain a dealer association"); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel
Corp., 467 F.2d 6, 10 (4th Cir. 1972) (no section 1985(c) claim when defendants'
attack on plaintiff was "spontaneous," motivated by plaintiffs' activities on that
particular occasion rather than by racial or other class-based animus).
78. For example, Phaby v. KSD-KSD-TV, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mo.
1979) (memorandum opinion), involved the dismissal of a political reporter for
KSD television who was a member of a ward Democratic club that did not en-
dorse the sheriff. The sheriff allegedly conspired with KSD to injure the plain-
tiff, who had continued to cover the election for the station. Arguably, the
animus involved was triggered by plaintiffs actions vis-A-vis defendants, but
the court held that plaintiffs claim was sufficient. Id. at 1053.
79. 582 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1978).
80. Id. at 318.
81. Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1233 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
930 (1973) (claim by a doctor who was allegedly dismissed from a hospital be-
cause he testified in a malpractice case).
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where the plaintiff did not allege that defendant's conduct was
"directed at a significant number of persons. '82 Although the
term "class" implies an entity of more than one person, at least
one court has declined to impose the requirement that the
plaintiff specifically identify other class members. 83
5. Groups Defined by a Trait Other than Being a Victim of the
Same Conspiracy as Plaintiff
Courts have also refused to find a protected class where
the group involved cannot be defined by characteristics other
than merely having suffered from the same conduct as the
plaintiff.84 For example, in Harrison v. Brooks,85 the plaintiffs
asserted that they belonged to a class consisting of certain
property owners allegedly injured by the rezoning actions
taken by the city council. The court denied recovery, finding no
relationship between the class members other than their status
as victims of the allegedly discriminatory rezoning.86 Simi-
larily, in Askew v. Bloemker,87 a case in which the alleged class
was comprised of citizens whose homes were raided by federal
drug enforcement agents on one particular night, the plaintiffs'
claim was dismissed:
Plaintiffs' class members shared no common characteristics prior to
the defendants' action. Indeed, their status as a "class" of victims de-
pends entirely upon the defendants' actions, and it is not possible for
defendants to have conspired to discriminate against a class that did
82. McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 75 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976) (citing McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.,
526 F.2d 870, 877 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 545 F.2d 919 (5th
Cir. 1977). In McNally, a case in which a prisoner sued a newspaper publisher,
prison officials, and a reporter for publishing a portion of a psychiatric report
that was not read at a court hearing, the court found no section 1985(c) claim.
See 532 F.2d at 69. In McLellan, the court held that an employee's discharge for
bankruptcy did not give rise to a section 1985(c) claim. See 545 F.2d at 933.
83. See Selzer v. Berkowitz, 459 F. Supp. 347, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (plaintiff,
a professor, alleged that he was denied reappointment with tenure and promo-
tion because he had talked to the CIA, plaintiffs inability to identify other class
members or prove similar conspiracies did not prevent the court from finding a
section 1985(c) class). Cf. Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386-87 n.5 (1972) ("the
protection of Section 1985f (c) I extends not only to ... racial minorities but to
any person [who] is the object of invidious discrimination").
84. See, e.g., Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1975)
(allegation by "legal workers" that employer and "illegal [alien] workers" con-
spired to subject the "legal workers" to substandard working conditions did not
give rise to a section 1985(c) claim); Poirier v. Hodges, 445 F. Supp. 838, 846
(M.D. Fla. 1978) (allegation by hearing aid dealer that state employees con-
spired to destroy his business by suspending his license did not give rise to a
section 1985(c) claim).
85. 519 F.2d 1358 (lst Cir. 1975).
86. Id. at 1360.
87. 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976).
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not exist until after they had acted.
8 8
As one court has stated, the class must not be a "congeries of
persons who become a 'class' by virtue of the denial to them of
some advantage or their involvement in a single common kind
of action. '89 Even if there is a community of interest allowing
the class to be certified under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for purposes of a class action, it does not fol-
low, according to one court; that "animus against such a group
can be considered class-based, [when the group members]
share no other trait-racial, religious, ethnic, sexual, geo-
graphic, or economic."90 Although these limitations help to
avoid a general federal tort remedy, additional criteria are nec-
essary to positively identify groups protected by section
1985(c).
6. Groups That Possess Discrete, Insular, and Immutable
Characteristics
Some courts have suggested very narrow definitions that
positively identify groups under the statute's protection. One
court has even suggested that section 1985(c) extends only to
members of a racially oppressed group or a group serving invol-
untarily.9 1 A more widely accepted requirement is that a class
must possess "discrete, insular and immutable characteristics
comparable to those characterizing classes such as race, na-
tional origin, and sex. '92 Courts base this definition on the
principle that individuals should not be discriminated against
because of traits for which they bear no responsibility.9 3 While
this is a laudable rationale, courts appear to use it primarily to
avoid overexpansion of federal jurisdiction 94 or to ensure uni-
88. Id. at 678.
89. Scott v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 229-30 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
90. Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 269, 274 (E.D. La. 1978) (oil
industry workers who were allegedly blacklisted for making personal injury
claims not protected under section 1985(c)).
91. See Heyn v. Board of Supervisors, 417 F. Supp. 603, 607 (E.D. La. 1976)
(quoting Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, 210, vacated en banc per
curiam as moot, 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975)).
92. Kent Island Joint Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 459 (D. Md. 1978)
(quoting Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (E.D. Va. 1973),
affd, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974)) (although local officials imposed water and
sewerage restrictions on residential land developer, this did not give rise to a
section 1985(c) claim).
93. See Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243
(3d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979).
94. See, e.g., Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 1975);
Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 842 (8th Cir. 1975) (Webster, J., dissenting); Heyn
v. Board of Supervisors, 417 F. Supp. 603, 607 (E.D. La. 1976).
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form application.95 If the definition of protected classes were
the sole limitation on section 1985(c) claims, the requirement
that classes be defined by immutable characteristics might be
justifiable. Coupled with the other elements required by Grif-
fin-a conspiracy, an overt act, and the violation of a protected
federal right96-this definition is not only overly restrictive, but
it is also inconsistent with Congress' original intent. The
clearly voiced concern of Congress for Union sympathizers, 97
for example, would not be recognized under this approach.
7. Minorities That Have Suffered Past Discrimination
A similar, but broader definition of a protected class in-
cludes groups that have been discriminated against in the past
and that constitute a minority akin to a racial minority. This
concept of class has been used to allow recovery for discrimina-
tion against both women 98 and religious groups.99 Although
women are not a numerical minority, the Third Circuit has sug-
gested that "[t] he fact that a person bears no responsibility for
gender, combined with the pervasive discrimination practiced
against women, and the emerging rejection of sexual stereotyp-
ing as incompatible with our ideals of equality,"' 00 is sufficient
reason to include women as a group comparable to a racial mi-
nority. Similarly, the comparison of religious minorities to ra-
cial minorities can be supported on the ground that
membership in a minority religious group, like membership in
a minority racial group, has historically excited the "fear, ha-
tred and irrationality of the majority."' 0'
A requirement that the class be akin to a racial minority
and subject to past discrimination is defensible in light of Con-
gress' primary purpose-to afford citizens protection from Ku
Klux Klan activity-and the persistently voiced concern
t roughout the Congressional debates for the protection of mi-
nority rights in general. 02 Jews, Native Americans, Hispanics,
95. See, e.g., Western Telecasters, Inc. v. California Fed'n of Labor, 415 F.
Supp. 30, 33 (S.D. Cal. 1976). See also Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
269, 273-75 (E.D. La. 1978).
96. See note 20 supra.
97. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235,
1243-44 (3d Cir. 1978); cases cited in note 40 supra.
99. See cases cited in note 39 supra.
100. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d
Cir. 1978). See Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 949-50 (D.N.J.
1978).
101. Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
102. See notes 61-65 supra and accompanying text.
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and Chinese, as well as women and blacks, would certainly be
protected classes under this definition. Furthermore, the no-
tion of suspect-like classes could also be used to extend protec-
tion to groups such as aliens, ex-convicts, and the handicapped.
If past or historical discrimination is required, however,
most groups defined by ideology or political belief would be ex-
cluded from the scope of section 1985(c).10 3
8. The Local 1 Definition
An expanded definition of protected class was proposed in
Local 1 (ACA), Broadcast Employees v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters.0 4 The court allowed a local union to re-
cover under section 1985(c) for retaliation by the international
union because of the local's opposition to a merger and because
of the local's support for the international's former president.105
The court stated that "a distinction is 'invidious' and thus un-
lawful if it adversely affects a traditionally disadvantaged group
along 'suspect' lines, is insufficiently 'rational' in light of the re-
spective interests of each party, or unnecessarily burdens free
exercise of a 'fundamental right.' "106 "A traditionally disadvan-
taged group along suspect lines" is virtually synonymous with
the "akin to racial minority" definition of protected classes de-
scribed above. In addition to groups such as women, Jews, and
Native Americans, however, the Local 1 definition also reaches
classes subject to an "insufficiently rational" distinction and
classes engaged in the exercise of a fundamental right, if the
defendant's actions unnecessarily burden the exercise of that
rightl07 The inclusion of insufficiently rational classes adds lit-
tle to the substantive reach of section 1985(c) if the traditional
rational basis test is applied, since under that test, the defend-
ant need only demonstrate one reasonable ground for the clas-
103. If a past or historical discrimination requirement is imposed, many
plaintiffs currently accorded status by lower courts as members of protected
classes would be denied a remedy for conspiratorial discrimination. See notes
41-48 supra and accompanying text.
104. 419 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
105. Id. at 276-77.
106. Id. at 277 (footnotes omitted).
107. Id. The court cited traditional equal protection cases as examples: Me-
morial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (law that conditioned right
to receive free county medical care on duration of residence abridged right to
travel and was therefore unconstitutional); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (discrimination against aliens, a suspect class); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970) (classification based on family size rationally related to the
state's interest in equitable distribution of limited welfare funds). Id. at 277 nn.
24-26.
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sification for recovery to be denied.108
The court in Local I focused primarily on the fundamental
right aspect of its definition, finding a violation of the local
union's federal right to free speech,109 and therefore a prima fa-
cie section 1985(c) claim. 110 This approach effectively expands
the scope of section 1985(c) protection to include classes de-
fined by ideology or belief, although there are obvious
problems in accurately determining how "unnecessarily bur-
dened" a class must be to warrant protection. These problems
are not insurmountable, however, and as one court commented,
A conspiracy to deprive a person of his right to free expression merely
because he is a member of a group advocating an unpopular position or
supporting the election of an unpopular candidate can certainly be
classified as a conspiracy based on an invidiously discriminatory ani-
mus, as required by Grijffn.111
Although the Local 1 definition might not receive the approval
of a Supreme Court that is hostile to federal jurisdiction over a
potentially large number of section 1985(c) claims, 112 the inclu-
sion of ideological as well as suspect-like groups, if applied in
concert with other requirements, 1 3 would not open the floodg-
ates to recovery. A federal tort law would still be avoided.
9. Protected Classes: A Proposed Definition
As illustrated above, the Supreme Court has not set out
specific criteria for determining which classes of discrimination
victims fall within the purview of section 1985(c). Given the
108. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970). For exam-
ple, if higher rates for disability insurance-for women are found to be reason-
ably related to women's longer life expectancy, a discrepancy between male
and female insurance rates would be rational. Cf. Johnson v. City of Cincin-
nati, 450 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1971) (traditional standard for evaluating em-
ployment classifications based on sex has been rational basis test). But see
Life Ins. Co. of N. America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499, 502-05 (9th Cir. 1979) (in-
surance company's higher rates and fewer benefits for women gave rise to a
valid section 1985(c) claim). Similarly, if a private employer fires an employee
because of his political beliefs and activities, relief could be denied on the
ground that the dismissal was necessary to avoid a conflict of interest. Contra,
Phaby v. KSD-KSD-TV, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (plaintiff's dis-
charge because of his membership in a Democratic organization gave rise to a
valid section 1985(c) claim). In short, the rational basis standard is easily met.
109. Free speech is secured to members of labor organizations by section
101(a) (2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 411(a) (2) (1976).
110. 419 F. Supp. at 276. Contra, Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345, 2352-53 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
111. Puentes v. Sullivan, 425 F. Supp. 249, 252-53 (W.D. Tex. 1977).
112. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345,
2352 (1979) ("deprivation of a right created by Title VII cannot be the basis for
a cause of action under § 1985(c)").
113. See note 20 supra.
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confusion and inconsistency among lower court decisions, a
more uniform approach is desirable. A definition of protected
classes that included only easily recognized or well-established
classes" 4 would aid in uniformity of application, but would
only afford protection to some groups exercising first amend-
ment rights. Although the plaintiff should be required to estab-
lish the existence of a class other than one composed of victims
of the same tort,"5 more is necessary to identify the groups
protected by section 1985(c).
The most viable definition to effectuate the intent of the
statute and yet limit its scope is a modified version of the ap-
proach in Local 1.116 The plaintiff would have a section 1985(c)
cause of action if he could demonstrate that the defendants
conspired against him because of his membership in a group
that is (1) suspect-like or akin to a racial minority, or (2) en-
gaged in the exercise of a fundamental right and the defend-
ant's actions unnecessarily burden the exercise of that right.
This definition falls between the requirement that the class
possess discrete, insular, and immutable characteristics, an ap-
proach that is too restrictive in light of Congress' intent to pro-
tect all groups subject to the organized lawlessness of the
Klan,"n7 and the definition suggested by the Westberry court,
requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate an "intellectual nexus"
between himself and an identifiable body," 8 an approach that
is both vague and difficult to apply.
Under the first element of the definition, the fact of past
discrimination could be used to determine the degree of simi-
larity between the proposed class and a suspect class such as a
racial minority group. Thus, suspect-like classes would poten-
tially include groups defined by race, sex, national origin, reli-
gion, physical disability, and affectional preference. Under the
second element, courts could apply a balancing test to deter-
mine whether a fundamental right has been unnecessarily bur-
dened. Such a test has been suggested by one commentator to
determine the federal rights protected by section 1985(c),n'9 but
114. See notes 69-71 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 84-90 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
119. See Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: McLellan
v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 90 HARv. L. REV. 1721, 1731-32 (1977) (limita-
tion of section 1985(c) could be accomplished by "establishing a sphere of pri-
vate autonomy which is removed absolutely from the purview of the statute, or
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it is equally applicable to a determination of classes covered by
the statute.
Several courts have suggested this balancing approach. In
Crawford v. City of Houston,120 the plaintiff alleged that city of-
ficials discriminated against him because of his expressed
views on the nonaddictive nature of marijuana. The court de-
nied the defendant's motion to dismiss, noting that "[t]he va-
lidity of the distinctions drawn by the defendants will depend
on whether, and the degree to which, governmental interests
are furthered by this differentiation."' 21 Similarily, in Glasson
v. City of Louisville,122 the court found a valid section 1985(c)
cause of action where city police officers destroyed the plain-
tiff's protest sign because its message was critical of the Presi-
dent. The court examined the government's interest in
preventing the provocation of the crowd on a motorcade route,
found that this was only a minor consideration, and concluded
that the classification of persons whose signs opposed the Pres-
ident was invidious. Therefore, the court reasoned, section
1985(c) applied.123
A balancing test could be utilized in all cases involving
classes defined by the exercise of a fundamental right. In
Brown v. Villanova University,124 for example, the plaintiffs al-
leged that among the students who participated in a mass vio-
lation of a dorm visitation rule, more severe punishment was
imposed on members of the "Ad Hoc Committee" that
presented student grievances to the University administra-
tion.125 Under the proposed definition, the members of the "Ad
Hoc Committee" would be protected by section 1985(c) if a
court found that the students' right to free speech outweighed
the University's interest in maintaining the status quo.126
by balancing privacy and associational interests against the government's inter-
est in preventing discrimination in each situation").
120. 386 F. Supp. 187 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
121. Id. at 194.
122. 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975).
123. 518 F.2d at 912.
124. 378 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
125. Id. at 343-44.
126. It should be noted that some courts have denied recovery under sec-
tion 1985(c) for private infringement of first amendment rights because of the
absence of state action. See, e.g., Doski v. M. Goldseker Co., 539 F.2d 1326, 1333
(4th Cir. 1978); Murphy v. Mount Carmel High School, 453 F.2d 1189, 1193-95
(7th Cir. 1976); Baer v. Baer, 450 F.. Supp. 481, 492-96 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Other
courts have allowed recovery in such situations, reasoning that section five of
the fourteenth amendment authorizes congressional action to protect free
speech from private conspiracies. See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227,
1233-37 (8th Cir. 1971); Puentes v. Sullivan, 425 F. Supp. 249, 251-53 (W.D. Tex.
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Groups defined by religious belief could be protected under
either the suspect-like class or the fundamental rights ap-
proach. Although a minority religious group may be considered
akin to a racial minority, the notion of suspect-like classes
would have to be stretched considerably to reach the conclu-
sion in Action v. Gannon,127 that a white Catholic parish can be
protected under section 1985(c).128 The more appropriate anal-
ysis in that case, which the court arguably adopted, is an analy-
sis of whether the church members' religious freedom was
unnecessarily burdened by the black militants' disruption of
church services. 129
Political and union activists would also be protected under
this definition. In Indian Political Action Committee v. Tribal
Executive Committee of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe,130 a
case in which supporters of one candidate allegedly infringed
on the voting rights of supporters of an opposing candidate by
tampering with the election results, the court found no class-
based animus.' 31 Under the proposed definition, section
1985(c) would apply because of the burden on the exercise of
voting, a fundamental right. In both Arnold v. Tiffany 132 and
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,133 union organizers were not af-
1977); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833, 837-39 (S.D. Ind. 1972). See also
notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text. Thus, even if a protected class is
found through a balancing approach, recovery may still be denied if a narrow
view of section five is adopted. For examples of private conduct that would not
be prohibited by section 1985(c) under this view, see text accompanying notes
120-123 supra.
Full consideration of the section 5 issue is beyond the scope of this Note;
however, given the importance of the right to freedom of expression and the
very real impediments that private action can impose, section 1985(c) should
be extended to reach private actions that deny first amendment rights. Upon
acceptance of the interpretation of class-based animus proposed in this Note,
such an extended application of section 1985(c) would not result in the over-
expansion of federal jurisdiction feared by the Griffin Court.
127. 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971).
128. It seems clear from the facts in this case that the defendants were
stimulated to disrupt the church services by racial and economic mo-
tives .... [The defendants] made these demands to a predominantly
white parish [and] to other white churches .... The premise underly-
ing the selection of [these] targets is that these churches have sub-
stantial amounts of money, the use of which [defendants] hoped to
control for the benefit of economically deprived black people.
Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir. 1971).
129. See id. at 1232-33.
130. 416 F. Supp. 655 (D. Minn. 1976).
131. Id. at 653. But see Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 840 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958 (1976).
132. 487 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 (1974).
133. 460 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. Okla. 1978).
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forded class protection under section 1985(c).13 4 Union or-
ganizers would, however, qualify as members of protected
classes under the proposed definition if their freedom of associ-
ation was unnecessarily burdened by defendants' retaliatory
actions. Similarly, in Phaby v. KSD-KSD-TV, Inc.,135 a case in
which the court held that membership in a Democratic club
was sufficient for purposes of section 1985(c), the issue under
the proposed analysis would be whether an individual's right to
political affiliation outweighs the employer's interest in pre-
serving the appearance of political impartiality. 36
This proposal would not dramatically expand the scope of
section 1985(c), since it would require the plaintiff to demon-
strate that the defendants conspired against him because of his
membership in a suspect class or a group engaged in the exer-
cise of a fundamental right. These limitations would deny sec-
tion 1985(c) protection to alleged classes that are merely the
products of "imaginative" pleading,137 and groups that are
clearly beyond the intended scope of the statute. Bankrupts, 13 8
newcomers, 139 and nonlawyers, 40 for example, would remain
unprotected classes under the proposed definition.
B. PLAINTIFF'S MEMBERSHIP IN A PROTECTED CLASS
In addition to establishing that the class is protected under
134. [This court rejects] claims of class-based animus allegedly di-
rected towards groups which did not tend to exist prior to the occur-
rence of the events set forth in the complaint and which tend to be
defined by one particular activity or by plaintiff's individual situation.
[If the court were to hold that] animus directed against employees...
who were organizing a union [provides the necessary motivation ele-
ment], § 1985(3) could become applicable to all conspiratorial interfer-
ences with the rights of others ....
Id. at 407.
135. 476 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (memorandum opinion).
136. Phaby involved a private television station that fired one of its political
reporters, allegedly because of the reporter's membership in a ward Demo-
cratic club. Id. at 1053. Since the reporter was removed from the political beat
at the behest of the city's sheriff, a candidate for political office, the court was
able to find a conspiracy involving state action. See id.; note 126 supra.
137. Several courts have expressed concern with the potential proliferation
of classes. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 460 F. Supp. 399, 407 (W.D.
Okla. 1978) ("there are no bounds upon the ingenuity of counsel in pleading
novel and diverse classes to fit every conceivable situation"); Kops v. New York
Tel. Co., 456 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("§ 1985[(c)] is not to be ex-
tended to every class which an imaginative pleader can contrive"), aff'd mem.,
603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979).
138. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1977).
139. See Morgan v. Odem, 552 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1977).
140. See Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1978).
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section 1985(c), the plaintiff usually must also demonstrate a
relationship to that class. The plaintiff could argue, however,
that neither the language of section 1985 (c)141 nor its legislative
history14 2 require the injured party to have any relationship to
the class of persons that defendants seek to deprive of equal
protection, since class-based animus addresses the defendant's
motive rather than the plaintiff's class membership. Several
courts have recognized this argument and have held that an in-
dividual who is an advocate for, but not a member of, a class
may recover if the other elements necessary to state a cause of
action are present. 143 For example, in Richardson v. Miller,14 4
although the court recognized that "unlike Griffin the plaintiff
is not a member of the class allegedly discriminated
against,"' 45 it found a prima facie section 1985(c) claim because
the plaintiff was an advocate for racial equality. 146 Similarly,
the court in Pendrell v. Chatham College'47 held that "discrimi-
nation because of advocacy of the rights of a racial or otherwise
141. Section 1985(3) provides for a cause of action in any instance
where "in furtherance of the object of' a proscribed conspiracy an act
is done "whereby another is injured in his person or property." By its
terms, the statute gives no hint of any requirement that the "other"
must have any relationship to the "person or class of persons" which
the conspiracy seeks to deprive of equal protection, privileges or immu-
nities.
Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (3d Cir. 1978),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979). At least one
court has suggested that membership in a class is not required by section
1985(c):
While it is true . . . that [section 1985(c)] was immediately aimed at
the protection of blacks ... ,Congress chose the words "any person or
class of persons." It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume, that the
protection of [the statute] extends not only to blacks and other racial
minorities but to any person or group that is the object of invidious dis-
crimination.
Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386-87 n.5 (6th Cir. 1972) (emphasis in original).
142. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 188 app. (1871) (remarks of Rep.
Willard), quoted in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) ("the essence
of the crime should consist in the intent to deprive a person of the equal pro-
tection of the laws") (emphasis added). The Griffin Court noted further that
"full effect to the congressional purpose [can be given] by requiring, as an ele-
ment of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation
stressed by [Congress]." 403 U.S. at 102 (emphasis in original).
143. See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235,
1244-45 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2345
(1979) (white male advocate for women); Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247,
1249 (3d Cir. 1971) (white male advocate for racial minority); Pendrell v. Chat-
ham College, 386 F. Supp. 341, 348 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (white female advocate for
rights of blacks and women).
144. 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971).
145. Id. at 1249.
146. Id.
147. 386 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
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class-based group is sufficient"' to come within the scope of
the statute. The Third Circuit has stated that since a close
reading of Griffin reveals "no intimation that, had one of the
plaintiffs ... been a white civil rights worker, he would have
been denied the cause of action which his black compatriots
were granted,"' 49 an advocate for women's rights could, by
analogy, maintain a section 1985(c) cause of action.15 0
On the other hand, the First Circuit has interpreted Griffin
to require that defendants must have conspired against plain-
tiffs because of their class membership.15' At least one lower
court has denied recovery to plaintiffs who were "innocent-
bystander victims of... racial prejudice,' u5 2 because they lack-
ed the inherent, immutable characteristics that identified the
particular class.15 3 Such a limitation is not defensible, espe-
cially when it is indisputable that the alleged animus was both
class-based and invidiously discriminatory. 5 4 In light of the
language and legislative history of section 1985(c), it should
suffice that a plaintiff's injuries resulted from an invidiously
discriminatory animus.15 5 At a minimum, if the defendants be-
lieved that the plaintiff was associated with the class, recovery
should be allowed.
C. INVIDIOUSLY DISCRIMINATORY ANIMUs
The final, and perhaps most important issue in the determi-
nation of class-based animus involves plaintiff's burden of prov-
ing that defendants' actions were motivated by an invidious
bias against a protected class. The Supreme Court has not
clearly stated what the plaintiff must allege in his pleadings to
make out a prima facie case or what the plaintiff must subse-
quently prove at trial. Lower courts have developed differing
approaches that have produced anomalous results. For exam-
ple, although one court has found that a conspiracy to
deprogram followers of the Reverend Moon satisfies the ani-
148. Id. at 348.
149. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1245 (3d
Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979).
150. Id.
151. See Harrison v. Brooks, 519 F.2d 1358, 1359-60 (1st Cir. 1975).
152. DesVergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 448 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (D. Mass.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 601 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1979) (water district's refusal
to extend water to plaintiff-housing developer's subdivision, allegedly because
officials had misrepresented to voters that subdivision would serve low-income
blacks, did not give rise to a valid section 1985(c) claim).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See notes 141-142 supra and accompanying text.
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
mus requirement, 5 6 another court has held the reverse when
faced with a similar fact situation. 157
While courts agree that the defendants' motives must be
invidiously discriminatory, courts disagree about what "invidi-
ously discriminatory animus" means in specific contexts. Some
courts have found it difficult to separate the protected class is-
sue from the motivation issue. For example, in Uston v. Hilton
Hotels Corp.,158 the court denied recovery to a plaintiff who al-
leged that the defendaht casino operators had conspired to de-
prive him of the opportunity to play "21.' u1 9 The court noted
that the plaintiff had failed to prove an invidiously discrimina-
tory motive in excluding "better than average blackjack play-
ers" from the casino.160 This case might be more accurately
explained, however, on the ground that "better than average
blackjack players" are not a protected class under section
1985(c).
Other courts have emphasized that the invidiously discrim-
inatory motive must be attributed directly to the defendants
156. See Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1978). The court
stated:
fT]he allegation [that] the Foundation holds itself out to be a "busi-
ness" dedicated to deprogramming members of certain religious "fac-
tions" satisfies the class-based animus requirement, insofar as it may
be inferred from this alleged purpose ... that its agents and plaintiff's
parents conspired to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights be-
cause of his status as a member of such a religious group.
Id. at 490.
157. [Defendants acted primarily because of] maternal concerns of
Plaintiff's mother. [Plaintiff's mother's] actions.., arose not from her
abhorrence of the Unification Church per se, but rather arose directly
from the solicitude which a mother holds for her daughter's health and
well-being. Defendants as agents of [plaintiff's mother], derived their
motivation from this same maternal solicitude.
Weiss v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 724 (D.R.I.), afrd mem., 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2858 (1979). See generally Note, The Deprogram-
ming of Religious Sect Members: A Private Right of Action Under Section
1985(3), 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 229, 241 (1979) (criticism of Weiss v. Patrick analy-
sis).
Confusion has also resulted because often the discussion of the issues is
limited to a one-sentence description of the court's conclusions. See, e.g., Scott
v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 230 (E.D. Tex. 1978) ("[I]t is obvious . . . that the
acts of violence upon these individuals ... are manifestations of the in-will and
hatred these union members harbor toward non-union individuals."); Guerra v.
Roma Independent School Dist., 444 F. Supp. 812, 816 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("We find
no cause of action under § 1985 [ (c) J."); Bradley v. Clegg, 403 F. Supp. 830, 833
(E.D. Wis. 1975) ("1 believe that the plaintiffs' allegations of a conspiracy di-
rected against a class of picketing, striking teachers are sufficient to state the
discriminatory intent required by 42 U.S.C. § 1985.").
158. 448 F. Supp. 116 (D. Nev. 1978) (memorandum opinion).
159. Id. at 120.
160. Id.
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themselves; an animus in others is not sufficient. For example,
in Smith v. Ross,161 an interracial band left town after a deputy
sheriff had told their landlord that the police would not protect
the building from townspeople who had threatened to burn it
down.162 The court denied recovery because the discriminatory
animus motivated not the sheriff or his deputies, but the towns-
people, none of whom were named as defendants.163
In Scott v. University of Delaware,164 a black assistant pro-
fessor alleged conspiratorial racial discrimination on the part of
University officials after the professor was assigned to teach
unfamiliar course material, denied use of staff or equipment for
NAACP activities, and harassed by students. 165 The court de-
nied recovery because "[a]t best, these factual allegations indi-
cate unlawfully discriminatory activity by an unspecified
number of students, and possibly by some unidentified mem-
bers of plaintiff's department. The complaint in no way impli-
cates any member of the Board of Trustees, the President of
the University, or the Vice President for Academic Affairs.' 66
The courts' conclusions in Smith and Scott-that the de-
fendants did not themselves possess the requisite animus-
may have been hasty. In both cases one could argue that by
condoning or, as in Smith, directly participating in discrimina-
tory activities, 16 7 the defendants did in fact act with class-based
animus. In these situations, the plaintiff should be given the
opportunity to prove such a connection between the defendant
and others possessing the class animus.
The most frequently and most appropriately invoked sec-
tion 1985(c) requirement since Griffin is that defendant's mo-
tives must be class-based. 68 Indeed, many plaintiffs have been
denied recovery where no discriminatory animus has been al-
leged,169 or successfully proven.'7 0 The statute provides a
161. 482 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1973).
162. Id. at 34-35.
163. Id. at 36.
164. 385 F. Supp. 937 (D. Del. 1974).
165. Id. at 945.
166. Id.
167. See Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33, 34-35 (6th Cir. 1973).
168. Cf. Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1978) (complaint dis-
missed where it did not charge a conspiracy directed at nonlawyers as a class).
169. See, e.g., Bova v. Pipefitters & Plumbers Local 60, 554 F.2d 226, 227-28
(5th Cir. 1977) (although nonunion employee was allegedly fired because of his
antipathy toward the union, there was no allegation of class-based animus);
O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hosp., 472 F.2d 1140, 1144-45 (6th Cir.
1973) (although black doctor was dismissed from hospital staff for opposing
merger that would harm the black community, there was no allegation of class-
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cause of action only where the alleged conspiracy is directed
against a person as a member of a class; personal animus is not
sufficient. 17 1
Specific allegations of class-based discrimination are also
required; a pleading that contains only conclusions will be dis-
missed. 172 In Spencer v. Community Hospital,173 for example, a
black physician who was opposed to the merger of two hospi-
tals because, in his view, the merger would have an adverse ef-.
fect on the black community, brought suit under section
1985(c) when his staff privileges were revoked. The court dis-
missed his complaint for failure to allege facts demonstrating
that the deprivation of his privileges was motivated by his race
or by his opposition to an intentionally discriminatory hospital
merger. 7 4
Other courts have recognized that some forms of racial dis-
crimination are more difficult to support with specific allega-
tions than others. In Croswell v. O'Hara,175 the court stated:
Proof of racial motivation depends on an overall analysis of the totality
of factual circumstances . . . and such matters normally do not lend
themselves to more than conclusory allegations.... Certainly the fact
that plaintiff and defendants were of different races gives rise to the
possibility that defendants' acts were racially motivated. A great deal
more is needed to prove the issue, but, in the absence of a more ade-
quate method of pleading, I conclude that plaintiffs allegation in this
case is sufficient. 1 7 6
based animus); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6, 10 (4th Cir. 1972) (al-
though plaintiff was attacked by defendants while photographing them for the
purpose of prosecuting their employer under the Refuse Act, there was no alle-
gation of class-based animus).
170. See, e.g., Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
439 U.S. 1003 (1978) (although tenured black law professor was allegedly fired
because of racial discrimination, there was no proof of animus); Potenza v.
Schoessling, 541 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1976) (although plaintiffs allegedly were
fired because of their criminal records, there was no proof of class-based ani-
mus); Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F. Supp. 1068, 1086-87 (D. Md.
1975), affd mem., 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir. 1976) (although white person was al-
legedly fired because of racial discrimination, there was no proof of animus).
171. See, e.g., Duff v. Sherlock, 432 F. Supp. 423, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1977), and
cases cited therein.
172. See, e.g., Herrmann v. Moore, 576 F.2d 453, 457 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1979) (recovery denied to law professor allegedly dismissed
for advocating equal opportunity for minorities; plaintiff offered no specific alle-
gations of discriminatory actions toward plaintiff); Schoonfleld v. Mayor of Bal-
timore, 399 F. Supp. 1068, 1086 (D. Md. 1975), ard mem., 544 F.2d 515 (4th Cir.
1976) (recovery denied to white prison warden alleging racial discrimination as
reason for his dismissal; court refused to presume discriminatory purpose).
173. 393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
174. Id. at 1079.
175. 443 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (alleged false arrest and beating of
black woman by four white policemen).
176. Id. at 897-98.
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Similarly, in Paschall v. Mayone,177 the court denied a motion
for summary judgment to a white deputy sheriff who allegedly
beat a black plaintiff and denied him medical care, reasoning
that the plaintiff might be able to develop proof of a past his-
tory of discriminatory beatings and ultimately recover. 178
Even if a prima facie case is established and a summary
judgment for defendants thereby avoided, the plaintiff still
must successfully prove the existence of a discriminatory mo-
tive in order to recover damages. Courts have not agreed on
the standard of proof required of plaintiffs, although most
courts have refused to infer class-based motive without a
strong causal relationship. As the court in Croswell empha-
sized, mere proof that the plaintiff is black or an advocate of
black concerns has not been sufficient to prove racial ani-
mus. 17 9
In Phillips v. Fisher,180 the court found no proof of class-
based animus where an interracial couple alleged that movers
stole their belongings because of a bias against interracial mar-
riages. The court explained:
We do not say today that a plaintiff who seeks relief from alleged racial
discrimination must allege facts which inescapably lead to the finding
of a race-based animus on the part of a defendant. There are situations
where the facts alleged themselves lead to a reasonable inference that
the motive behind a defendant's actions may have been race. For ex-
ample, if a black man is refused service in a restaurant, an allegation
that the cause thereof was racial prejudice squares with the common
experience of men in everyday life, and the causative inference is a log-
ical one to draw. On the opposite end of the continuum is the situation
where the wrong committed is not of a sort which is likely to be moti-
vated by race. If a black man is arrested fleeing the scene of a bank
robbery, it does not comport with the common experience of men to in-
fer that the motive or cause for his arrest is his race .... 181
Some courts go beyond these basic requirements and make
the plaintiff's burden of proving class-based motive more diffi-
cult. For example, some courts require the plaintiff to show
that the defendant's motivation was such that persons not in
the plaintiff's class would have been treated differently in the
same fact situation. In Taylor v. Nichols,182 for example, a po-
liceman who sued the city attorney under section 1985(c) for
prosecuting him on an assault and battery charge arising out of
a traffic arrest was denied recovery for failure to prove that
177. 454 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
178. Id. at 1299.
179. See text accompanying note 176 supra.
180. 445 F. Supp. 552, 557 (D. Kan. 1977).
181. Id. at 556.
182. 558 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1977).
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nonpolice piersonnel had not been prosecuted in similar cir-
cumstances. 18 3 In 900 G.C. Affiliates, Inc. v. City of New
York, 184 the city revoked plaintiff's cabaret license allegedly be-
cause the cabaret's patrons were black. The court stated that
the plaintiffs had offered no proof that "persons similarily situ-
ated-e.g., owners of discotheques frequented by whites-are,
or would have been, treated in a different manner."185 While
different treatment of those similarily situated is the essence of
discriminatory activity, it is overly rigorous to require a plaintiff
in each case to demonstrate that different treatment has in fact
occurred.
Several courts have found that proof only of a spontaneous
reaction or an isolated incident is insufficient to allow recov-
ery.186 For example, in Croy v. Skinner,187 the court held that
the defendant's statement that he "was sick and tired of Jews
taking advantage of honest white people"' 88 fell short of show-
ing the class-based animus necessary under section 1985(c).
Requiring proof of a history or pattern of discrimination, how-
ever, is overly burdensome when motive can be proven in other
ways. Because discrimination may take many forms, the ques-
tion of proof will necessarily vary in each case. Any set of facts
that permit a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive
should suffice to shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
demonstrate that there was no class-based animus.
An additional problem arises if more than one motive is es-
tablished. Although one court has held that class-based dis-
crimination need not be the sole motive, 8 9 the majority of
courts have been reluctant to allow recovery when other mo-
tives are present, especially when discrimination other than on
racial grounds is involved. In Johnson v. University of Pitts-
183. Id. at 568.
184. 367 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
185. Id. at 5.
186. There is no averment in the complaint that the defendants at-
tacked the plaintiffs because the latter were environmentalists, as has
been suggested in this Court; the allegations of the complaint are spe-
cific that the assault was sparked solely by the instant reaction of the
defendants... . Theirs was a purely spontaneous act, not alleged to be
a part of any general pattern of discriminatory action directed to any
class ....
Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6, 10 (4th Cir. 1972).
187. 410 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1976)..
188. Id. at 125.
189. Payne v. Bracher, 582 F.2d 17, 17 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant's failure to
rent plaintiffs apartment because of racial discrimination gave rise to a valid
section 1985(3) claim, even though other motives were present).
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burgh,190 the court found that since defendants articulated le-
gitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to grant
promotion and tenure to plaintiff, a female professor, no section
1985(c) claim could be maintained, even if sex discrimination
might also have been involved: "[I)n the absence of a clear car-
rying of the burden of proof by the plaintiff, we must leave such
decisions to the PhDs in academia."'191 The approach in this
case, however, is not consistent with the purpose of the statute.
Section 1985(c) was designed to prohibit and deter class-based,
invidiously discriminatory actions and to facilitate a remedy if
injury has occurred. Recovery should therefore be allowed
whenever an invidiously discriminatory motive is proven and
all of the other Griffin elements are satisfied, despite the pres-
ence of additional motives.
While no specific criteria or test can be advanced to guide
courts in their determination of whether class-based motives
are sufficiently alleged and proven, a general approach can be
suggested. Although an animus in others alone is not sufficient,
a plaintiff should be given the opportunity to demonstrate a
connection or concerted action that links the defendant to
those possessing the animus. Similarly, personal animus alone
should not be sufficient to allow recovery under section 1985(c);
but courts should find that the animus requirement has been
satisfied whenever a class-based motive is established, despite
the presence of additional motives. In addition, courts should
dismiss an action at the pleadings stage only when it appears
certain that the plaintiffs are entitled to no relief under any in-
terpretation of the facts that could be proved to support their
claims. 192 Certainly mere proof of the plaintiff's membership in
a class is not sufficient to establish that the defendant acted
with a discriminatory motive. Motive, however, is an inherently
elusive concept, and plaintiff's burden should not be made an
impossible one. The plaintiff should not be required to prove
that persons in a different class would be treated differently or
that there is a pattern of past discrimination. Instead, any facts
that permit a reasonable inference of a class-based, invidiously
190. 435 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
191. Id. at 1371. The court also reasoned that it was "beyond its field of ex-
pertise" to determine qualifications for promotion and tenure and thus could
not allow plaintiff to recover. Id. It should go without saying that lack of exper-
tise is no excuse for permitting discrimination that has been proven to exist.
Courts should not dodge difficult questions merely because they are difficult.
192. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
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discriminatory motive should be sufficient to shift the burden
of proof on the issue of motive to the defendant.
III. CONCLUSION
The application of the class-based animus requirement is
one illustration of how the potentially broad implications of the
Giffin decision have been significantly narrowed by lower
courts' divergent attempts to carve out section 1985(c)'s "con-
stitutionally permissible periphery."' 93 While the concept of
class-based animus cannot, and indeed should not, be mechani-
cally applied, a more uniform approach is necessary to afford
protection in appropriate cases and prevent overexpansion of
federal jurisdction. The analysis appropriate to determine the
existence of a section 1985(c) cause of action is three-pronged:
first, whether the class is protected by section 1985(c); second,
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class or sufficiently as-
sociated with the class; and third, whether the defendant's mo-
tives are in fact class-based.
To determine whether a class is protected by the statute,
the court should consider whether the alleged group is akin to
a racial minority, or whether the group is engaged in the exer-
cise of a fundamental right and defendant's actions unnecessa-
rily burden the exercise of that right. Past discrimination is
one indication of the degree of similarity between the proposed
class and a suspect-like or racial minority group. A balancing
of the rights involved should be used to determine whether the
exercise of a fundamental right is unnecessarily burdened.
Once it is established that a class is protected, the plaintiff
should only need to prove that he is associated with or an advo-
cate for the class; membership in the class should not be re-
quired. Few concrete criteria can be proposed to adequately
define the final element, the proper standard for the allegation
and proof of defendants' bias against the class. Allegations
should be liberally construed and courts should acknowledge
common-sense inferences that circumstances may suggest.
The burden of proof on the question of motives should shift to
the defendant whenever the facts presented by the plaintiff
permit a reasonable inference of an invidiously discriminatory,
class-based motive.
The purpose of section 1985(c) as originally enacted was to
provide a remedy for invidious, discriminatory conspiracies
193. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 107 (1971).
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that violated fundamental federal rights. The definition of
class-based animus proposed in this Note would effectuate this
purpose and yet prevent section 1985(c) from becoming a gen-
eral federal tort remedy.

